AD2S Podcast - Combat MRO at the Core of Air Superiority: “Holding Out Five Minutes Longer”

April 8th 2026 -  French Air and Space Force Lieutenant General Stéphane Groën, Territorial Commander of the Air and Space Force and OGZDS Southwest (General Officer of the Southwest Defense and Security Zone), opened the roundtable discussion on January 13th, 2026, by positioning himself “from the Forces and users ‘ point of view [in order] to demonstrate why it is important, in the context of a high-intensity engagement, to have an effective combat MRO.”

He began by emphasizing the crucial importance of air superiority in the context of a Multidomain (MDO) campaign, which relies as much on air maneuver as on a robust, responsive, and enduring combat MRO.

Inherited from the great thinkers of air power - from Clément Ader to John Warden - air superiority does indeed determine freedom of action in all environments and all theaters (1). It allows one to strike first, sustain operations over time, and negotiate from a position of strength.

On the other hand, its absence leads to the stagnation of the battlefield, the paralysis of ground and naval maneuver, and unsustainable attrition, as illustrated by both the Battle of Midway during World War II and the current fighting in Ukraine.

“Air superiority retains its strategic character for several reasons. The first is doctrinal. Air superiority remains the cornerstone of the Air Force, which is the military option of first resort for the political decision-making apparatus, as demonstrated by the past thorty years’ conflicts. Control of the skies determines the ability to strike first, to sustain operations over time, and to arrive at the negotiating table with the upper hand.

The second reason is operational and strategic. Air superiority - whether total, local, or temporary - provides a reasonable assurance that the battlefield will not become deadlocked. With it, we open corridors, set the tempo, and create the windows of opportunity our forces need. Without air control, ground maneuver becomes paralyzed. Naval freedom of action shrinks, and the electromagnetic spectrum becomes saturated against us. Without air control, the armed forces lose freedom of action in all environments and on all fronts, while suffering attrition that becomes ultimately unbearable”, stressed General Groën.

Achieving this superiority is, in fact, never a given. It is built through integrated, sequenced, and joint maneuvering, aimed at wearing down the enemy’s air power, breaking through their access denial bubbles, and striking their regenerative capacity to create an “entry point” into the enemy’s defense system. This involves the combined neutralization of sensors, surface-to-air defenses, command and control systems, and the electromagnetic and cyber environments, followed by the immediate exploitation of the windows of superiority created.

Recent examples, such as the U.S. Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela or Israeli raids, illustrate this logic of opening a corridor allowing ground forces to operate under air cover. In this dynamic, air superiority extends far beyond the airspace itself. Effects originating from other domains and fields (satellite neutralization, cutting of undersea cables, destruction of critical platforms) directly contribute to blinding the adversary and maintaining the upper hand. Deep strikes against the industrial base - targeting logistics, fuel, ammunition, and energy and transportation infrastructure - are fully consistent with the application of John Warden’s theory of the five circles (2), by targeting the enemy’s chokepoints and regenerative capacity.

But this maneuver cannot succeed without sufficient numbers and resources. Air superiority therefore requires large fleets of aircraft that are technically robust and capable of withstanding attrition. They must also contend with enemy threats, hence the importance of dispersed and agile deployments, as exemplified by the “French ACE” (Agile Combat Employment) concept: deployment on civilian terrain, regular training, hardened infrastructure, and the ability to maneuver under pressure.

At the heart of this technical-operational framework lies combat MRO. Rapid regeneration, repair, and return to service at a pace aligned with operational tempo are essential to survival and sustainability in high-intensity environments. In this context, availability—and the speed at which it can be restored—becomes a true weapon.

This requires versatile, well-trained, and resilient personnel, capable of operating for extended periods, supported by rapid feedback loops and continuous training that integrates the latest technologies. The inclusion of young men and women from the upcoming French Volunteer National Service (SNV – Service national volontaire) should also help expand the talent pool.

Before concluding with Montgomery’s famous quote - “to lose the war in the air is to lose the war, and to lose it quickly… ” -, General Groën echoed the words of General Burkhard, former Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, and before him, Marshal Foch and Clemenceau (3), to emphasize that the objective is therefore to “organize ourselves to hold out five  minutes longer than the enemy.”

Notes

(1) The concept combining domains and fields, referred to as “multi-domain/multi-field” (M2MC), is the French adaptation of the American concept of “multi-domain” or “all-domain operations.” The domains referred to are land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace. The fields are informational and electromagnetic.

(2) Colonel John Warden served as Special Assistant for Policy Studies and National Security Affairs to the Vice President of the United States under George W. Bush. A leading theorist of U.S. Air Force air power in the late 20th century, he developed a strategic approach to warfare centered on deep air operations.

(3) During a hearing before the National Assembly on June 25th, 2025, the former Chief of Staff of the French armed forces stated the following:  “Let’s be clear and realistic: if we allow the war to continue in this manner, I fear that Russia will be able to hold out five minutes longer than we can (…) ” (quoted in: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l17cion_def2425078_compte-rendu). 

Georges Clemenceau, for his part, declared in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on March 8th, 1918, that: “The one who can hold out morally the longest is the victor: the victor is the one who can, for a quarter of an hour longer than the adversary, believe that he is not defeated. ” A few years earlier, Marshal Foch had expressed a similar idea, stating that “war is a struggle of wills. Victory belongs to the one who knows how to will it for longer.” (quote taken from “On the Principles of War,” lectures from 1900–1901, published in 1903).

Photo: In-flight refueling during Orion 2026 © French Air and Space Force

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